Decisions, decisions ...This post provides a place for comments, if any, on the material in week 4's lecture summarised below:
Decision making
- Drawing on H&R’s review of perspectives on how decisions get made
- How do Stone’s arguments in her Ch. 10 fit?
- What is it, and why is it difficult?
- Perspectives on possibly doing better
- Various kinds (not always what they seem)
11 comments:
I disagree with Stone's negative comments on the "rational methods" - cost-benefit analysis, risk analysis, and decision analysis. Stone didn't consider that one can assign various probability distributions(uniform, normal, skewed, etc) to each cost/benefit/outcome variable to model its uncertainty close to reality and that one can run thousands of simulations on this model to estimate the overall impact. As a result, the overall result itself will have its own probability distribution. Only then, decision makers can make an informed decision by looking at what risks/uncertainties that their decision is likely to imply. There is no better way.
I have found out that this guidepost is located in Sanya, a beatiful city with splendid beaches:-) For those who are not familiar with China's geography, Sanya is a famous tropical scenic spot in South China’s Hainan provine (island).
Turning back to the issue of decision-making, Stone compares “Rational-Analytic Model” with “Polis Model” in her chapter 10. If I understands correctly, Stone argues that although “Rational-Analytic Model” is effective and usual in many cases, it would not be widely used in polis.
We are often at a crossroad of making decisions, not to mention politicians. As I see it, both “Rational-Analytic Model” and “Polis Model” are valueable, yet we need to be smart enough to apply them in a balanced way.
As for a strong, capable and decisive leader (like Putin), decision-making is actually not that difficult, nor is implementation or evaluation. Only weak, incabable and indecisive decision-makers would get lost in that process.
Deborah Stone's argument is that one cannot divorce public policy decision-making from its political context. This does not necessarily mean, though, that such decision-making can not be rational. Her point is that it is not always and/or need not be rational (as construed by rational choice theory). The persistence or enduring attractiveness of the rational method of decision-making is evident and contemporary governments recognize its usefulness. The issue is whether it is (or should be) the one and only or best way to make decisions given a particular public policy problem.
Decision-making in the real world may be modeled, but should public policy officials decide on the basis of some rational calculation of costs and benefits, risks and uncertainties? Can all considerations that matter in a specific public policy problem really be factored in the model (or would others simply be “controlled”)? Ceteris paribus is only real conceptually/analytically (that is, in one’s mind); it is NOT real out there. You cannot “control variables” (as in a model) in the real world. Individuals are not even rational (which is not to say that they are crazy or completely irrational). One’s calculations and the assignment of values of probability distributions can even vary from person to person. Similar to Herbert Simon’s notion of satisfycing, individuals are in reality rationalizing, i.e., each one tries to make sense of reality and has his own set of considerations and way of making decisions (which may not necessarily be shared by every other actor in the policy process).
For example, just look at how democratic governments decide on the allocation of their national budget. How should they decide on how much to allot for each ministry/department? Should education get more than national defense or vice versa (or should they get the same amount)? Or should each ministry’s budget be defined irrespective of the other’s budget allocation? But then, how about the many other ministries aside from education and national defence – how would their budget allocation be decided on? While there are institutions (i.e., sets of rules and norms) that may guide lawmakers in budget deliberations, it is very difficult (even undesirable) to use a rational model to come up with their final decision.
Having said this, let me again reiterate that this is not to say that the rational model should be discarded altogether; we just have to recognize its real limitations. Nonetheless, we also should not ignore the political context of decision-making. My critique of Deborah Stone’s article is that it focuses too much on the contrast between the rational or market approach and the political or polis approach to public policy. Beyond this, in reality, public policy is contested between and among political actors (even including those who are or claim to be rational actors).
What I would like to stress is that acting politically is not necessarily bad, selfish, or against the public interest; this is too narrow a conception of politics. To act politically (that is, the process of conciliating mutually exclusive policies given a certain predicament) is part of the human condition. As future public policy servants in our own countries, we should recognize the indispensability of politics in our desire to create public value (because there are individuals out there who also use politics in the interest of only a few, worse at the expense of the public). As Sir Bernard Crick pointed out (owing intellectual debt to Aristotle), politics is not only a necessary evil; it is also a realistic good.
Reading through richard's post reminded me of what we learnt in one of our economics lecture of how people do not make fully rational choices. The example given by Prof Hui was how a tourist could give a handsome tip despite the distinct possibility that he/she would not be visiting the place again anytime soon. Even economists who place such an emphasis on rational individuals acting to maximise their self benefit have recognised that people do not behave in that fashion all the time. I can understand why Stone argues that the rational model cannot possibly be applied in the polis and at the same time, understand why the rational model was the dominant model for a very long time. Man can be logical, rational yet be wholly unpredictable. Life is full of paradox. To make sense of this madness, it is so much easier to assume that there is some order.
Excellent comments. I tend to agree with David that it may be possible today to model probable decisions by identifying and assigning values to risks, uncertainities etc. And to Stone's credit, she does initially seem to agree with this method of decision making before she rejects it.
There are several examples in law where ignoring rational methods have resulted in bad decisions. For instance, there are hundreds of cases where the accused is found guilty by jury, but is actually innocent if you applied forensic science.
And the opposite is also true - guilty by science, but set free by the jury. And this is what Stone is trying to underscore. Like Ting and Richard state people tend to also use contexts, perceptions, biases, experience, exposure and instinct to take decisions.
I am sure Ting will agree, one of the skills we are taught at law school is how to frame a question. And this is because often you can mould the respondents thought process and answer, by how you frame the question. Stone shares this same opinion.
And David, just a suggestion. I found it easier to view Stone as primarily explaining why decision making isnt only a science, and not so much as replacing it.
Richard and Bharath's comments lead me to think - Is there a correlation between strong institutions and more "rational" decisions? The Polis appears to include the power play of actors with different motivations that not reducible to rational theorists "best interest" calculations.
(Of course, one problem I sometimes have is differentiating actors and institutions, eg, chen haitao writes about Putin - actor but also perhaps an institution in himself? Complete with SOPs, stability and rules of the game.)
Nonetheless, we see that if decision-making includes many such actors like Putin, it may be less susceptible to the sort of analysis that that "rational-analytic model". Institutions, on the other hand, are more easily analysed.
So, one hypothesis is this - the stronger or more pervasive institutions are, the more "analytical" we can be towards decision-making. This is not to say that the resulting decisions will be any better, just that the decision process itself can be more easily analysed, ie more "scientific", and perhaps more easily justified as "rational". Strong institutions would also weaken the effect of actors, whose motivations are not reducible to rational considerations, (as ting observes with the tourist).
For example, in Singapore and Britain, where there is a strong civil service, the rational-analytic model appears to apply.
Hmm... lots of interesting thoughts!
One of Stone's big points would be that you can't separate the "rational methods" from the people that use them. A government might use the rational methods mentioned in the posts to determine what they think the best method would be to achieve the GOVERNMENT'S policy goals. An interested NGO might use similar methods to determine THEIR ideal outcome and strategies. Similarly with a business group, and so on. But the clash and disagreements among the results of those similar rational methods (but with different starting points) may not result in a "rational" political process, especially if you think "rational" equals non-political.
To put it another way, when people talk about the "rational method," they usually do so as if the method is somehow implemented without actors. That will never be the case. Another argument sometimes given is: the government is the only body that can be (a) neutral and/or (b) rational. Is that true, is it just an excuse to keep power, or something else?
Also, I would like to highlight another point that's been discussed: is acting politically always bad? In many cases, without disagreement, we don't learn. For example, science is founded on disagreement; there are lots of experts who said that it wouldn't be possible to fly. And I can't help wondering how many of us here today owe a debt of gratitude to our predecessors who stepped away from the majority to study, live in new places, and interact with people who were "strange" and "different."
What a familiar fingerpost in the blog, I can recognize the city for my first seeing. It must be from a very beautiful city – Sanya, paradise for holiday. I strongly recommend you to go there, maybe in your recession week, but not now
As Professor mentioned above, one of Stone’s big points is you can't separate the "rational methods" from the people that use them. Yes, I totally agree with his point. But in now days, the definition of “the rational methods” between policy makers and people that use them would be totally different. I remember in the first class, we were asked the question “Do you think your politicians and bureaucrats have a clearer idea of what they are doing?” and most of us said “No”. But if all of us believed they hadn’t made the right decision around world, how can the civilization keep going ahead for ever. That’s maybe the paradox to the general people.
A big challenge for policy maker now I think is how to keep the balance between “Rational-Analytic Model” and “Polis Model”.
It is interesting to run through the wisdoms shared by Professors and colleagues on decision making in agreement and disagreement to Debora Stone's model.
Policy making is generally a complex process and Debora's model is trying to explain various nature and aspects of conflicting interests prevailing in the society that deters sound policy making. The market model of decision making tends to be more rational than the polis but since it is guided by their self interests, they tend to maximize their satisfaction/welfare and ignore others. The Polis model also makes a rational decision but often fails as it has obligations to meet the demands of the general public which are varied in nature.
Politicians are not necessarily bad. Although they have their self interest they have more obligations to meet the public demand.
Agreements and disagreements in the Market and Polis model give us ideas about the complex nature of decision making in the real world situation. It is a food for thought for the future decision makers (could be us) and to explore plausible means to align any policy decision that create public value.
To tell the truth, I disagree with Stone’s idea on the huge distinction between the “rational method” and the “polis method”.
First of all, I don’t think there is much difference between the goals of “polis method” and the “rational method”. Yes, it is true that in the real world politicians prefer to setup ambiguous goals in order to attract wilder range of support, while the goal should be more concise in the rational method. However, do you think a politician will not have a clear, concise, and definite goal for himself? Also the ambiguity should be somehow restricted. When someone is aiming to solve the garbage collection in the community, will he target at the climate change or the human rights in the universe? In other words, goals should not be too ambiguous to be misunderstood. In conclusion, the hotdog inside the package of hamburger is still a hotdog.
Second, I think there is nothing to do with the adherence to the original goals, but something to do with the long-term and short-term prospective. The goal in polis model will shift because it is measured in the long run, while that in analytic model is usually measured in the short run. And a good rational analysis should also change it goal when new problems are identified during the process.
Thirdly, oh, this should be the last point so that the comment will not be too long. Polis model is nothing but the abbreviation for rational analysis model. So in my view, politicians just select several points from a rational analysis according to his/her preference and then label it “polis model”.
Michael
There is an interesting replica of the same discussion in the medical field. With the advent of 'evidence-based medicine', doctors are being taught to decide on the basis of existing evidence from clinical trials - much like the 'rational' way of decision making. Disease models and costing analysis should provide a more objective anchor when a doctor manages a patient. This school of thought has become prevalent that medical schools do implement the policy of requiring courses on evidence-based medicine. There is a caveat though: patients are unique and may actually be the 'outliers' in the research models. Thus the wisdom of rational thinking + value judgement. I do observe this synergy in the political arena. The most effective policy initiators I've met, those who work behind the scenes and actually 'suggests' to the government what to do, are armed with data - data from rational analytical methods. How the data would be utilized? Now, that would require some degree of excellent politicking skills. Rational thinking should not be treated as the enemy of the Polis because when used together, both could provide means of arriving at the most feasible solution when the need arises.
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